Jan Techau – Pomiędzy Supermocarstwami. Europa wobec rywalizacji USA-Chiny (wersja z napisami)

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Jan Techau – Pomiędzy Supermocarstwami. Europa wobec rywalizacji USA-Chiny (wersja z napisami)

young takeout director program of those prof Arab German Marshall found his national Goss team kill Khalid – sneaky rava Bruxelles King Purim Carnegie European CEO Pineau vinegar analytic abar zone is Allah’s Nagar common totora if wizkid leave a good comment that electrical system a service of Brooke Sally sue Collini taxibro it’s a linear Raghava as for you me wash the best compromise of Amin commenter’s a minha vida’ Jenna Bruxelles ke vltava bars OHS Ryan is shy Nami bottom goes abuser spoon Janos Bartok rejewski a discussion spines member prodigy director pura gmf of Varsha VA me how buranovskiye Cinque Bardot – was Albert’s noise pollution naturally washes ballina home to provideniya yun daeho not a movie with spiky and zika yak doctor him amateurs even Tyndall Buddhist thing in queer thank you very much Merrick for that very fine introduction I was the only person I think in the room no there’s the second person with a head phone on their ears which makes me already kind of the striped animal in the room I indeed to not understand polish nor speak it so you are actually should be glad that I will be speaking in English because in Polish it would be a wasted morning for you it’s great to be here in Warsaw I’ve met Marek last night we had a conversation already and it’s always great to come from Berlin and also in earlier times from Brussels to this place because it is a place that has energy and aspiration it is not a saturated place like Brussels and Berlin often can appear to be and so the energy here is often a great corrective for somebody who comes from the big bubble towns to this town and and to get the messages here I would like to thank Marik and the European Commission office for doing this has been in the making for quite some time and the great element that made all of this possible is Marc’s patience with me who really you know stuck to the plan and endured quite a bit of haggling and and and uncertainty about the date so you know mark your patience as always is is the key ingredient to making this a success you know as as also your ten year in Brussels is proof of but also to another convoluted Xia who make this possible whose co-hosting this and I’m really curious to you know start a relationship with your organization is this the first time that I’m working with you and I’m quite curious to learn mmm you know how you see the world and and how this can how this can infuse my own work with new thoughts the topic that was chosen for today is the question of you know Europe in between the new rivalry between the US and China basically the big question of the new order that is emerging and how we play a role in it I mean it could not really be a much larger question I guess it’s a huge topic some of the answers that you might be looking for you will find in the report that was published yesterday the big s purse with the report that was published by the European institutions yesterday which I printed out and it is actually quite an interesting and very direct language that you will find not the usual Brussels Brussels document language goulash but something that’s really quite to the point and quite straight have a look at the SBUs report it looks at 2030 so basically ten years into the future and it makes for sobering for a sobering reading I have to say you cannot blame the EU institutions for not seeing the writing on the wall whether that means action is another question but in terms of the analysis and in terms of the clarity of the view and the problems that we’re facing there cannot really much be much of a doubt so starting with this question of how do we fit into this new order as Europeans between the two big rivals maybe starts with a question of what kind of situation do we actually want what kind of life do we want in that new order and the answers that are always true are the simple ones you know we want to be prosperous to be free and we want to be at peace that’s always true those are the three pillars that always kind of apply but of course in practice that means a couple of more various more much more sophisticated things that that means first of all it means that we want to be free from political and nuclear blackmail secondly we want to choose

whom to share our sovereignty with I think it’s a very important point sovereignty is kind of the buzzword of the day and lots of sovereign tests are running around you know claiming that sovereignty is kind of the highest good and it is but the real question is not you know whether you can completely keep it because you can’t that’s not the world any longer that we live in the question is whom do you share it with and do you do it voluntarily we want a world in which we can decide ourselves whom to share our sovereignty with that’s the situation we would like to maintain in that new world order that’s emerging we want to be capable of serving our people and provide them with the basic needs and we want to sleep at ease at night which means that there needs to be trust in the system the kind of secret ingredient to the whole European enterprise is trust more than money or anything else but for that you need people who infuse trust and produce trust and also deserve trust you need some guardians of trust in a way and you need to have some hope that the future is going to be good you know we tend to say in big speeches that you know the best days are ahead of us nobody knows that but we want to hope that at least the future would be good maybe not you know Stella maybe not you know something that necessarily needs to be 150% better than the present but it needs to be good and once that hope disappears you get radical politics as we can also observe in Europe these days so how can we have that life that you know I’ve just sketched out very roughly I think it depends in my opinion on for questions primarily of course it depends on tons of things but I will pick the four that I find the most important ones and then perhaps later on we can go into a Q&A in which we look at some other factors as well and I will give you those four questions right away before going into them the first question that that will decide as to whether we can have that is does America want to keep its real estate in Europe is it still interested in its sphere of influence which is a word that not everybody likes doesn’t want to keep its real estate in Europe the second question is can we add an element of power politics to the EU the third question is how can we stay economically viable and strong and the fourth one is what does China actually want from us those are the four questions that I would raise today and then again as I said you can perhaps focus on millions of other questions as well but this is my offering here for today so the first question does America want to keep its real estate we in Europe live off borrowed stability we live under an American security guarantee a nuclear umbrella that allows us to do this to have this life and the big question is can it stay that way that is a crucial strategic question and it’s important to remind ourselves that America’s function was twofold in this box Americana that we’ve always been talking about for so much it has an external function that’s the protective function the security guarantee administered through NATO with a nuclear element very important one but it also had an internal effect on Europe the American presence in Europe because it made obsolete all of the old power rivalries between the Europeans and among the Europeans it put those on mute by being the most dominant political and military power in Europe America put the old rivalry revelries between the Germans and the French and the Swedes and the Austrians and whoever played a role in 2,000 years of history put them basically on the sidelines and that was a trust infusion because of this Europeans could trust each other because the old rivalry question wasn’t important any longer and one of the most important prerequisites that we forget when we talk about European integration is that American trust infusion that made that possible so what we’ve seen and this is the dramatic part of this argument is over the last 25 years roughly we’ve seen a reduction of the American footprint in Europe pretty systematically until recently when we saw a reinvestment but we’ve seen a draw down of both the military and the political footprint it’s also more difficult in Washington to make a case for Europe these days than it used to be so our currency is weaker so the question is when there is less of an interest and I think the reinvestment that we’ve seen in recent years is not anywhere near to make up for what we lost in the previous decades it’s important but it doesn’t make up for it the question is if that let go for that reduction of American interest comes in how does the European rum market react to this my opinion you some of the rivalries some of what we call Reed nationalization in Europe also has to do with the fact that that American trust infusion has been withdrawn from the market and that the American disciplining power in Europe is weaker so we have seen this reinvestment but we also have serious doubts about the reliability of the American role in Europe partly because of this president

partly because of long-term trends that will lead the United States away from Europe to very quick examples to illustrate that mechanism one is the INF that mark already mentioned just now the INF treaty in the INF decision to basically phase it out if you want to put it into kind words that was a decision taken both by Russia and the United States for different reasons but basically unanimously because they both feared China that’s the big story that very few people tell it is not primarily a decision that had to do with Europe and this tells you how our strategic value in in this entire big power game is already one of secondary or tertiary importance both Russia and the United States decided that they were part of a treaty that put them at a disadvantage visa vie China in a new world with China as a power player that it wasn’t when the treaty was created and we are at the receiving end of this decision it is made because of a reason that’s outside of Europe to basically kill INF but it is a decision that will have a tremendous impact on Europe because of the asymmetry of interest while Russia is interested in China and America is interested in China Russia is also tremendously interested in Europe and we’re not so sure whether that interest exists on the American side as well and Russia will most certainly use that decision to change the Power Balance in Europe and that’s going to be a problem the key thing in the INF decision is that a big strategic decision that affects our power balance in Europe was made not because of us but because of some bigger player outside of the European theater that tells you that we are not the number one strategic concern any longer we are of secondary or tertiary importance and that’s a big strategic change during the Cold War for America in order to prevail in that contest with the Soviet Union it was key to own Europe in the contest with China it is perhaps not no longer key to own Europe how do we deal with this and then there’s a second decision which also puts this American ownership of property in Europe into question and that is the way that the United States decided to alienate the Europeans first before it took the trade battle with China lots of people that I talk to ask themselves why did Trump if he really is concerned about China as a trade problem and as a currency problem why did he first alienate the Europeans who were his best allies in this battle with China who have 100 percent the same concerns about Chinese trade and currency policies and if you can afford or think you can afford to alienate your best partner first before tackling the big one then maybe something with your strategic priorities is so different from the past and that we Europeans really should be should be should be alerted I’m saying this as an ardent transatlantic sis who believes that the Europeans need America and need America’s presence on the ground and is working for a transatlantic organization the gmf but there is a reason to also be concerned not just about our part of the equation our part of the equation is in any way is lackluster and I’m talking coming from a country which is not particularly forthcoming with its contribution to Transatlanticism these days but at the same time we need to be worried whether America wants to keep its real estate in Europe first question so we need as Europeans to keep America in the old rationale and in order to keep them in I think we have to do two things we have to be serious about our own security because otherwise why should America be if we’re not serious about it ourselves and secondly we must be in some way or another useful to the Americans in that new order this is interesting that you find that sentence also in that s past report that was published in Brussels yesterday as I said it’s quite a sober assessment they’re not really fooling themselves there the second question can we add a power politics element to the EU the EU get slammed a lot for not really being a very strong foreign policy player and for good reason you know the one voice question can Europe speak with one voice can it finally become a player that you know is a foreign policy player the same way that it is a trade player can its money that it spends around the world translate into political influence as well and that those are justified criticisms but they’re also slightly unfair because the European Union when it was created was not meant to be a power projecting foreign policy player that was not its role the EU was made for serving mostly a European internal purpose it was meant to make people rich reconstruct the continent and it was meant to work as a compromise machine to deal with the problems that Europeans otherwise fight out in the battlefields and it works brilliantly that way the core purpose for which it was built works brilliantly the most blame is heaped on the EU for things that was never built for but which now need to be delivered foreign policy refugee an asylum policy questions of the currency

perhaps if you want to go that way questions of social Europe which i think is a big seller in some countries and not such a big seller and others but Europe gets blamed mostly for those things that it wasn’t constructed for and now we have to make it different we have to build something that’s more useful not to make ourselves in my opinion strategically autonomous from the United States but to demonstrate to the United States that we are serious about ourselves and therefore you America need to be serious about us as well that’s the key rationale so we have to become more of a power player but that is difficult we are not a united continent we are a divided continent we have lots of politics in a very small space the continent of Europe is inherently unstable it is not inherently stable it as a continent that needs a reinvestment to its stability all the time look at the history books and so how can we do this if that American trust infusion is at least smaller than it used to be in my opinion the foreign policy part which includes the defense part if you think it to the end is probably not going to happen in that old integrationist logic of the EU that works better for markets and that works for you know other policies other related quality policies but I think the integration rocket logic does not really apply to foreign policy I’ve come a long way you know from somebody who was very hopeful about EU foreign policy who started a blog in your–in in Brussels strategic Europe arguing that it had to be but I think now that you know the hopes were probably too high I would look at something a bit more sober but the key thing is that the power that the EU is supposed to project needs to come from the Member States the Member States need to be the source of it and that means that only four or five or six can actually deliver because the rest is too small and the rest doesn’t really make too much of a difference not that they’re irrelevant they’re highly relevant because we want to keep Europe together but in terms of power projection their role will be smaller so with the UK most likely being out we have a very very small set of countries that can actually make a difference and they will not be able to make a difference alone so they need to find some sort of compromise in which they can give the EU a power projection capability it is of course primarily my own country in France Germany and France and it is then Italy Spain and Poland and it is then perhaps the Netherlands and Sweden it’s very unpopular in these kinds of conference to name countries and name names but I will name them so we can have a debate it’s interesting I think these are the countries ultimately that matter the most the rest also matters but these are the ones that need to come together whether that’s a European Security Council or some other mechanisms in which you bring them in it will not be a fully integrated foreign policy as some Federalists dream but it will have to be some sort of agreement of these countries that some muscle needs to be built and that needs to be put at the service of the EU if that’s not going to happen within the next 10 years until 2030 we will be toast we will not be able to care of our own about take care of our own neighborhood we will not be able to demonstrate to the Americans that we can take over some of the questions that they would like us to take over and we will not be able to demonstrate to our citizens that we are serious about the stuff that they’re concerned about I have no idea how that can be forged the only thing that I do know is that it needs to come from the member states it needs to come from the capitals the impulse needs to come from Berlin and Warsaw and Paris and Madrid and Rome and some other places it will not be coming from anywhere else the European institutions are not strong enough in their own right to create that energy it needs to come from the Member States and that needs means it also needs to come from here and and it certainly needs to come from my country but that’s gonna be a discussion that I hope we can have in the Q&A Germany’s role in this of course it’s crucial but also very difficult how can we stay economically strong economic power in many ways is the basis of all other power and it certainly is potentially the basis of our power and it is a source of resilience against other people’s money which we can see pouring and today there’s the EU China summit which is to a certain extent about Chinese money pouring into this market into the European market buying influence so how can we stay economically strong that the the the temptation of other money coming into this market is smaller growth innovation and immigration will be the key questions we have to reform the euro again my country will be at the forefront of this your country is not in the euro and will perhaps not be in the euro anytime soon but for the sake of all of the EU the euro needs to be reformed there needs to be some sort of political framework around the currency otherwise the imbalance between deep economic integration and shallow political integration is going to tear the whole thing apart some sort of compromise will need to be found and it will probably be quite expensive but a

lot less expensive than making the whole thing fail that realisation hasn’t reached Berlin yet but it will have to reach Berlin in order to get the euro on a stable footing we need to embrace the IT revolution and new technologies that includes new energy technology’s big growth will be NIT and in green technologies I’m not a green person you know from where I come from basically but when you look at the numbers when you look at where the growth potential is when you look at where the sheer necessity is that’s the sector that will skyrocket and it’s already doing so only that we don’t realize this the Germans are obsessed with their own cars but other industries are coming quite fast to catch up and we have to handle migration and immigration and we need to change the migration debate from a debate that is mostly concerned about how to send people back most effectively that is part of the equation as well that can’t be forgotten but the key thing will be whom do we want whom can we get and how can we integrate them an ageing continent as ageing very fast that has a demographic problem that we know we know about we read about this all the time but the massive impact that this will have and already has on our politics risk-averse ‘ti overspending on social services instead of some of the investment sites and security and so on and so forth those consequences are already in the debate we have to deal with migration one way or another and a strict rejection policy is not going to work yes migration has a cultural element but if we don’t handle it smartly the cultural element will be the smaller concerned bigger concern will be that our societies will ossify so one of the big answers to the economic question that I’m asking will be migration one way or another and then there’s this big challenge and it’s going to play out today pretty dramatically in Brussels as the EU China summit unfolds we’re going to see basically a clash between a market and competition driven entity like the EU clashing with an entity like China that has strong market power and like some liberalism in this some openness but not all of it China is in a dilemma because it likes the Liberal system that it has thrived and but at the same time the liberal system is a huge threat to it because it undermines the power monopoly of the Communist Party of China so it needs to find a kind of wiggle through in a way and we are in a bind as well because in principle we like markets the single market and open trade relations but at the same time we have national instincts and protectionist instincts so these two things will clash today and the big challenge is whether we can remain some retain some openness and liberalism in this clash that’s going to out played today I saw some quite pessimistic reports coming out of the press this morning saying that the EU will most likely walk away with empty hands from this summit because the Chinese are not willing to guarantee market access and and and I’m coupling an investment so on so that you don’t need a Chinese counterpart when you invest all of these big questions that are on the table but you can see how that new order and where the fault lines of the new order lie in that summit that’s playing out in Brussels today it sounds like a technical boring kind of thing you know trade with China it is indeed the very core of the question that we’re discussing here this morning in many ways is it going to be national champions or European champions against open market and competition and if not one or the other what kind of middle way an indication will also be coming from the coming us-china deal which is still kind of in limbo which we don’t know how it’s going to play out if the US and China gets some sort of trade deal and we will see you know which kind of side the open market side or the more protectionist that favor certain companies or others will prevail so watch this space it’s going to be hugely important for the question that we’re discussing this morning and then my fourth question and that’s coming kind of naturally from that last one is what does China actually want from us I’m not a China expert I talked to some of them regularly because we have them at the GM F but it seems to me that China shares with the Trump administration the idea that this is going to be an era of big power competition and and in that big power competition the purpose of the Communist Party of China the primary purpose is to stay in power so it needs to do two things it needs to provide prosperity to its people kind of the old deal that it has always been you know kind of doing with its own people for the last about 30 years and it will have to deliver prestige in the big power of competition because the Communist Party of China is in permanent warfare with its own people it needs to deliver prosperity and prestige so China is in big power mode and in that big power competition where the Communist Party of China needs to deliver when it comes to Europe it has

very clear I think ambitions it’s it’s either two things and the positive scenario wants to neutralize Europe wants to neutralize Europe so that in this big power competition it doesn’t fall on either side but it’s somewhere you know somehow neutralized and it’s not on the American side any longer in the worst case scenario it wants to turn us into a tributary part of the world that’s connected to the one bull one belt one road initiative to the Chinese mainland the two big markets in the Eurasian landmass together with us as being the tributaries who for some you know Chinese peace and quiet are willing to invest in the market and buy into the market without asking too many questions that’s the negative scenario I mean depending on your tastes you can look at as to where this is gonna fall but I think this is roughly where it’s going to go so China needs to upscale its economy from cheap production to sophisticated it’s wet it’s massively on the way to do this it seeks favorable trade terms watch Brussels today it seeks to expand its influence watch the 16 plus one conference after Brussels that’s going to happen tomorrow and it seeks to divide us from the u.s. to either neutralizers or Chinese and its tributaries so we’re not there yet fully but we’re on the way there and the answer to this is of course that you know all of the stuff that I said before we have to get economically stronger in our own right so that there is that we can be more resilient to the lure of the of Chinese money that’s pouring into our markets and also stronger so that we can deliver some geopolitical services that then don’t have to be supplied by others if we continue the bickering that we see now and the willingness to fall to the temptation of Chinese money pouring into our market again we will be toast it was a huge problem that Italy subscribed to the one belt one road initiative a couple days perhaps not as dramatic as some of the press reports made it but it is an ominous sign so for questions does America want to keep its real estate in Europe how can we stay economically stronger can we add a power politics element to the EU what does China actually want I haven’t talked about climate change or big data or urbanization or some of these other big mega trends that people keep on talking about but all of those things of course happen as well while we are asking ourselves the big four questions that I mentioned so certainly not a time to be complacent Europe will have a Europe will have a space in this new game that’s being played but what kind of space it is depends mostly on us but not entirely as I said it also depends on American decisions and on Chinese decisions but we have to be strong in all of this in order not to become just the object of these decisions that are being made currently we’re not creating a great image of being a subject a player but we need to we need to really turn ourselves into this which is why some of the euro skepticism that you see is is understandable and is warranted but it’s not the final answer to the question that we ask ourselves which is you know how can we have the life that I sketched out earlier and I want to say one thing about and that’s a final thing about this security guarantee issue that I mentioned in the first question there is a tendency to by lateralized us and I know that you know of course when I’m in Warsaw and this is a country that seeks a bilateral arrangement with the United States and it’s completely understandable I understand where it comes from how do you develop trust in NATO structures how do you develop trust in allies like Germany or France for that matter and if you can’t rely on them and what you seek is go to the hegemon it’s understandable and I would probably do a very similar thing if I were a decision maker in Warsaw but at the same time it is also a dangerous undertaking first of all a security guarantee that’s based on a monetary contribution is valueless it’s not worth the value America will defend Europe because of a strategic interest not because of a fee that we’re paying Washington has to decide whether it’s still in its interest to defend this market and not because we’re paying a billion or two or three or ten that’s not going to be the decisive factor it plays a political role but it’s not going to be the decisive factor and so if you have a security guarantee that’s based on bought soldiers that’s gonna be a very brittle one but at the same time it’s of course understandable that you seek it but I think we should not kid ourselves about the value of such a security guarantee if we cannot make a case to the United States as Europeans together that this is worth defending then the bought soldiers of America will not save us they will not be the trip wire that we hope they will be because mercenaries are less valuable then then

soldiers that are sent in good faith and I’m saying this you know also to provoke a little bit of a debate and I’m you know blackening and whitening this a little bit but I think this is what we need to think about and this is why that first question does America want to keep its real estate is so important if it wants to keep its real estate into a profit Center then that’s not going to work that’s not going to be a strategic relationship and I’m saying that’s being fully aware of my own country’s poor performance in all of this but I think we should also be aware that Washington’s decision decisions matter greatly and you cannot monitor eyes a security guarantee as soon as you do this it loses its value so the bilateralism that this country and also some other countries seek is not going to work it’s not going to work as much as a German equidistance dream is not going to work and as much as strategic autonomy in Europe is not going to work if we want an American security guarantee it needs to be the strategic one from both sides it cannot be monetized it’s a bit of a European instinct to monetize decisions it’s something that made the EU quite successful but in foreign policy these kinds of things cannot be monetized which is perhaps the most important reason as to why foreign policy cannot be fed into the old integration logic you cannot buy compromise either you’re there or you’re not in between way is not with the kind value that you need i leave it at this I hope I’ve tossed enough stuff out there most of these arguments are a lot more sophisticated that the ones that I could make in this very you know short you know presentation that I have prepared here this morning and of course you know as the think-tank I have the privilege to be sufficiently imprecise and also I’m not really responsible for anything that I’m saying afterwards which is great but I hope that at least you know we can have an interesting debate about these kinds of things thanks a lot for your patience with me and my mumblings and again to merrick and everybody else who made this possible thanks a lot you