Daytonski sporazum

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Daytonski sporazum

Greetings Today’s debate, which we prepared from our research programme Slovenian history from the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana, will be international It will be international because of participants and the subject matter We will discuss events in our neighbourhood, in which Slovenia also took part in some way A lot of people with Bosnian heritage lived in Slovenia at the time of these events, some of them were second generation A lot of Bosnians came to Slovenia in the period we will discuss We’re talking about the Bosnian war, and these people came as refugees Some of them stayed here On the 25th anniversary of the signing of Dayton accords I will talk with Husnija Kamberović, professor from Sarajevo Faculty of Arts and Božo Repe I am Bojan Balkovec, the moderator Both me and Božo are from the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana At the start of summer 1995, the war in Bosnia was raging for more than 3 years There were more than 100.000 casualties, many were forced to leave their homes At the start of July, the massacre in Srebrenica took place Srebrenica was under the protection of United Nations International community was not capable of ending the war and only after summer NATO attacks and Croatian operations against Knin Serbs (Operation Storm) the breakthrough came about Before we talk about the Dayton Accords (25th anniversary of the signing was yesterday), let’s say something about the pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina Husnija, what was Bosnia like in the last decade of socialist Yugoslavia? Bosnia in this period went through its biggest rise and then very shortly its very dramatic fall Let me remind you of winter Olympics in 1984 that put Bosnia on the map It improved the image, not just of Bosnia but also Yugoslavia in the world Suddenly Bosnia was not known just for the assassination in 1914 but also for these magnificent winter Olympics Buts soon after things changed Many affairs, spread of nationalism, despite the fact nationalism was more prevalent in Serbia & Croatia Kosovo crisis started having effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina Anti-Islamic propaganda that came from Serbia had an influence on the situation in Bosnia. Here was the first trial of Serbian nationalists Vojislav Šešelj was on trial for spreading Serbian nationalism In 1983 there was a trial of Young Muslims But the second part of 1980s was even more turbulent Some institutions of civil society were starting to awaken through Student movements This was an influence from Slovenia But there were other events shaking up Bosnian society Affairs came one after the other The Agrokomerc Affair, for example, which halved the Bosnian ruling elite, the Neum Affair, which also broke a large part of the Bosnian Communist elite There were also some other political affairs, for example Kecmanović Affair, implicating then-chancellor of Sarajevo University Nenad Kecmanović, who was one for the Bosnian candidates for Yugoslav presidency He was accused of being a British spy and was forced to withdraw from the campaign. There was also the Moševac Affair, when institutional influences of Milošević’s populism were already felt and in the end an affair in connection with Serbian counter-intelligence forces in Eastern Bosnia in 1990 Some Serbian intelligence officers were spreading rumours how Serbs in Eastern Bosnia are in danger, how they are running away because

of political favouritism of Muslims This led to tensions rising Bosnian leadership was weakened by these affairs, younger leaders couldn’t quite find their feet and at the start of 1990s The process of multi-party pluralism starts and we get the institutionalisation of nationalistic parties. Alija Izetbegović comes out of prison at the end of 1988, but he is not a well-known figure yet outside of a small Islamic circle. But then in 1990 comes the formation of new political parties, Serbian, Croatian, Bosniak, who very quickly found common ground, made a union and won the first democratic elections As soon as they formed government, they started arguing about the future and status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and these arguments that began in 1991 with formation of first democratic government are still on-going to this day I’d like to conclude that in the last decade of Yugoslavia Bosnia rose but its inner divisions, that is the fall of the old communist elite, led to Bosnia not being ready, incapable of competing with political elites from other republics which dictated the tempo regarding the question of the future of Yugoslavia There’s an old saying that we produce more history then we can process What was the situation in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, Yugoslavia broke up Božo, how was Bosnia functioning in all this? Its main problem was its multi-ethnic composition And another question, connected to this: what about Slovenian-Bosnian relations after independence? Milan Kučan prepared a report in 2011 for Slovenian government and it was later published in the translation of the book on Kučan in Sarajevo If we look at the situation just before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fact is, Yugoslavia by then was pretty much broken apart Slovenia and Croatia were recognised and so was Bosnia, but the effects in these three countries were different. Macedonia followed and all that was left was the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the union of Serbia and Montenegro So when the war started in 1992, Yugoslavia no longer existed That’s the basic fact, this is where all these polemics, international judgements etc. that defined the Yugoslav wars as a civil war and did not dare make a step forward and say it was basically an aggression on Bosnia. This aggression was done by Bosnian Serbs, but we need to know that here we had a sort of transformation of a part of the Yugoslav People’s Army into a local Serbian army Ratko Mladić was an officer in YPA So were many others Serbia also financed this army, gave it weapons and so on But international law has its own logic. If we look a bit further back, in 1990 and the first part of 1991, three positions formed in Yugoslavia

thru negotiations between presidents of the republics One position was advocated by Slovenia and Croatia. That was confederation The second was advocated by the central government. That was some sort of strong federation with more power for central government Serbian position was close to that, but it went beyond that and wanted a completely centralised Yugoslavia That was also the Army’s position Two republics, Bosnia and Macedonia, were searching for their own position somewhere in between. They were offering such propositions A federation that would find a compromise between a confederation and a strong federation But all these suggestions or ideas that were being discussed by presidents did not come to fruition It all went its own way, as Husnija already explained, into a planned ethnic conflict within Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia helped Bosnia when the war started, but it was not free We need to know that. It was a group of people from the Ministry of Defence, Janez Janša and a group of people who made a profit from the arms trade. These things were never brought to conclusion in court The next phase was discovery of weapons in Maribor airport This was recently discussed by Spomenka Hribar in her high-profile speech. Because of internal conflicts Janez Janša felt threatened by these affairs coming to light Slovenia was accused of violating the embargo. So Janša proclaimed Milan Kučan and his followers have hidden weapons in Maribor airport and plan to use it for a coup d’etat It was a complete construct. These weapons were meant for Bosniaks and was dearly paid for So from these good intentions in Slovenian leadership to help Bosnia not much remained because of internal conflicts. Unfortunately There was a lot of sympathy for Bosniak plight in Slovenia We’re talking about three ethnicities entangled in a conflict Later the relations were not great, we know that There was a number of problems Foremost the question of Ljubljanska banka, which did not pay out its savers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. That dragged on for a long time, until Slovenia lost in international court Slovenian politics was trying to move away from the Balkans. Throughout 1990s and early 2000s they wanted nothing to do with the Balkans Slovenia wanted to show it was outside this circle, that it belongs in Europe, EU, where it wanted to enter and so it let slip a lot of opportunities, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in Croatia and other places A lot of economic and political opportunities as part of the common

state, knowing the mentality, having economic ties etc This all came to nothing; this place was filled by Austrians & Germans After 2010, as you mentioned, interest in Bosnia in Europe started growing There were many discussions how to move things from a standstill, from this Dayton clinch and a discussion was prepared in the European Council and in this context then-PM Borut Pahor, that suddenly had ambitions in the Balkans, in international politics, named Milan Kučan as a special emissary Kučan had many dialogues in 2011 in Bosnia, as he knew most of the older politicians, and also some younger ones, and he wrote a report This report didn’t have any real influence, despite him presenting it to the president of European Council, that was Herman Van Rompuy at the time But an affair came from this, because Borut Pahor, out of context, took some thoughts from this report and told them in public in the United States at some meeting, that the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina must also be considered This started many polemics, reactions in Bosnian and Croatian press, on account of Milan Kučan. But if you read the whole report, Kučan didn’t mean that, he just pointed out the danger of it If I simplify it and, on that note, also finish, he said: Bosnia is suffocating within the boundaries of Dayton Accords that are also the constitution, there are two concepts here: one is the concept of three ethnicities, of which two want independence (Serbian and Croatian), with the idea of joining their ‘mother countries’, Croatia and Serbia, while Croatians also didn’t have the same status as Serbs, as they were part of a common Bosniak-Croatian federation. Opposed to this is the concept of citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that should rise above these nationalisms Bosnian politics are trapped by this and cannot find a way out He suggested Bosnia must be helped to get a new document, new constitution that would upgrade Dayton and that the goal should be to make Bosnia a normal democratic state, capable of living up to the principles and criteria of EU He warned about the stagnation This is the essence of our story, which didn’t end very successfully as far as BiH is concerned But his report was made in secret and was published in his biography for the first time in Slovenia and Bosnia Husnija was the publisher So the interested public can read the whole report in Bosnian or Slovenian languages If I may add to what Božo was just telling us, Kučan’s report on Bosnia which Božo published in his book on Kučan and we published it last year in Sarajevo. Kučan visited our History Fest last year and we talked

about this. As Božo said, the whole report can be read in this book I’d like to add a bit to the part on the start of the war When the war started in 1992, the Yugoslav Army was still in its barracks in Bosnia, in all the cities. They left the barracks in Sarajevo a month after the start of the war. In July Yugoslav Army acted from within in these military operations When Bosnia was internationally recognised, they were supposed to withdraw, but they didn’t do that All units just transformed into the Army of Republika Srpska The concept was very simple All who are from Bosnia and Herzegovina can stay in the army, but this army will no longer be called the Yugoslav Army, but the Army of Republika Srpska And all weaponry, tanks and such, was left in the possession of this new army, so this was, as Božo said, some kind of transformation with all heavy and light weaponry that the Yugoslav Army had at its disposal From the very start of the war it was about attacking civilians, for example, April 1992. From the very start there was a lot of cynicism regarding civilian victims. There was a famous statement of General Kukanjac (when they caught Alija Izetbegović) that he is a humanist It’s hard to understand somebody being a soldier and a humanist at the same time. We all remember many crimes against civilians, bombing of Sarajevo, Markale Market, concentration camps for Bosniaks in Bosanska Krajina etc Husnija, why didn’t the international community act more decisively to end the war sooner, since they knew from the beginning about these crimes International community couldn’t find the right answer at the right time and didn’t react well to the beginning of the war and it’s hard to understand what were the key reasons. Some say Europe couldn’t cope and America was absent. The US let Europe handle the Yugoslav crisis and all the problems Bosnia was having, including mass bombings of civilians America was focused on the peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union and Europe probably didn’t have enough strength or even understanding of what was happening in Bosnia. They didn’t understand the Bosnian problem Lord Carrington said (as Holbrook told in his book) that he never met so many liars in politics as he did in the Balkans Europe was dealing with political liars, didn’t really understand it and it allowed the war and mass killings to go on. French president Mitterrand even came

to Sarajevo and many believed there should be an intervention because of this complete lockdown of Sarajevo Mitterrand opened Sarajevo Airport for humanitarian aid and they thought this solves the whole problem and that they did what could be done A lot of people in America were under the impression of literature which explained all that was happening in the Balkans and Bosnia as something deeply rooted in history, that they should just let these tribes bleed out and when they will calm down the world will try to react. They were all afraid of direct involvement in the war, they were afraid of these Bosnian mountains and they let people die in Sarajevo, thousands of people in Sarajevo were killed, we saw those concentration camps all over Bosnia and Herzegovina All this was down to Europe not knowing what to do On the other hand, there is an interpretation that can’t be ignored and must be discussed. Some say Europe just let it happen because most victims were Muslims Even Holbrook in his book wrote: ‘How would Europe react if thousands of Christians or Jews were being killed?’ We must consider this aspect Why did Europe react so indifferently at the beginning? It wasn’t until the Americans joined the effort at the end of the war that there was bombing All these stereotypes which were used at the start to avoid military intervention, that these are warring tribes, that Europe and America should stay out of it, or they’ll get stuck in these Bosnian mountains like in Vietnam When they finally intervened at the start of 1995 it showed how wrong they were when they believed in these stereotypes. As it turned out, one robust military operation can very quickly yield results I mentioned at the start what brought about the end of the war in 1995 On the one hand we have one of the biggest tragedies in Europe, the massacre in Srebrenica, and on the other hand military operations against Serbs by the Croatian forces and of course, NATO bombings So, we get a breakthrough in autumn After preparations that took place since summer, representatives were put into an air force base in November and were told: ‘Boys, until you reach an agreement, you’re going nowhere.’ There were Alija Izetbegović, Bosnian president, president of Croatia Franjo Tuđman and president of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević The circumstances were a bit odd, or does it just seem that way Croatia and let’s say Serbia (formally Yugoslavia) were involved in talks, but were constantly saying they are not involved in this war

This sounds a bit contradictory How come these three were talking? Ok, formally Bosnian Serbs recognised Milošević as their representative But still, why didn’t they negotiate among themselves? All these three entities? A question for both of you I’d like to continue from where Husnija finished There are many reasons the intervention took place. He mentioned most I’d like to add Europe was completely helpless. Europe, as far as the whole Yugoslav crisis is concerned, was successful only in Slovenia with Brioni Agreement It failed everywhere else The US intervened partially because of internal reasons Srebrenica had a huge impact on public opinion. Clinton had a year left before election and he couldn’t afford for this to become a question of internal politics That’s an important reason Another important reason, as I see it, but it’s not discussed much, is the question of Bosniaks, called Muslims at the time. The war turned It turned mainly because of air support and bombings and because of Croatian-Bosnian agreement But it turned And that could mean more success for the Bosniak side It could lead to a similar development as in Croatia, Serbian exodus, at least partly. If we put this into a geostrategic concept, for the US and also for Europe, we can’t pretend otherwise, it would be very problematic (the way they saw it) if some kind of a Muslim state was created here It would be supported by Arab states, allies of the US There was a much wider scope than meets the eye The agreement itself was based on, as Husnija said, the fact the war went so far that people just wanted peace and would do anything for it Accept anything. Luckily, I didn’t live through this, but Husnija did It’s clear if you spent the whole war in Sarajevo, as he did, that any solution bringing peace is a good solution, especially if it’s designated as temporary and I think they built a lot on that premise About your question: Why Croatia and why Serbia? I think this clearly shows the nature of the war. Because behind the Croatian community in BiH, so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, stood the Croatian state. And behind Republika Srpska stood Serbia The Americans, who are ‘cowboys’, very pragmatic (this is how Holbrook managed things) simply found out where the power lies and the agreement will hold if it’s signed by them, of course in the name of others As observers or something like that That’s the whole story This is a good question, not written about that much The concept of Dayton Accords shows us what it was all about Two ex-republics, two new states wanted to split it between them That was evident in these secret agreements between Tuđman and Milošević. That was the point And international forces knew that I have nothing to add to what Božo said

It’s clear the international community, Americans and Europe, knew who is the generator of the war, they knew who is behind whom, they knew Serbia is behind the Army of Republika Srpska and that Tuđman is supporting the Croatian military forces of Herzeg-Bosnia that was proclaimed in Bosnia and Herzegovina Naturally they wanted to talk to the ones who could guarantee the agreement would be upheld Bojan already mentioned that Karadžić and Mladić had to give their consent that Milošević can represent them and sign everything in their name and that they will later abide by it Europe and the World knew who is behind Bosnian Serbs and who is behind Bosnian Croatians, so Milošević and Tuđman were included as negotiators in Dayton If we look at it, we see what Dayton Accords really are It’s a framework for peace. Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović, as the three presidents, are signed, not Boban, Karadžić and some other commandants Why is it so, if Serbia and Croatia maintain (even today) they never participated in this war, but they are signatories of Dayton Accords These days they claim they are guarantees of Dayton Accords and they were included not as warring parties, but are guarantees But in fact, even in the first agreement it clearly states Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, are signing this as different sides of the conflict It’s stated what Serbia guarantees It guarantees Republika Srpska will abide by all these agreements of the Dayton Accords So, I’ll conclude that the 3 presidents, Tuđman, Milošević, Izetbegović were in Dayton as representatives of their states despite Croatia and Serbia maintaining they weren’t signatories of the agreement as they had no part in the war, but were only guarantees, but this is completely false One more detail. I think Božo was talking about the end of the war and war operations and the great successes the Bosniak Army had thanks to cooperation with the Croatian Army. We know of these successes in Bosanska Krajina, even Banjaluka was in danger of being taken. This is no myth, people of Banjaluka were on the verge of packing and leaving What was the key thing here? I was told this by one of the members of the president’s cabinet of Bosnia He received a phone call from Alija Izetbegović in the middle of the night to talk of the advance of Bosnian and Croatian armies toward Banjaluka. And he was asked if they should allow this operation to finish with Bosnian & Croatian armies entering Banjaluka What was worrying Izetbegović? He asked if Croatian and Bosnian armies enter Banjaluka would this mean Croatian Army has taken over Banjaluka? And on the other hand, is Bosnia feasible if Bosnian Serbs leave Bosnia as Croatian Serbs left

Croatia after Operation Storm? Those were his doubts. And there was also the American threat so the offensive was stopped Izetbegović feared (maybe wrongly, maybe not) that without Bosnian Serbs it would be impossible to reintegrate Bosnia and if these parts were Croatian he’d have to deal with Tuđman who’d want to annex it This is another point which may help us understand what was happening and why the World intervened to stop the Bosnian war Let’s look at the Dayton Accords themselves now They were notified in Dayton, the base where negotiations took place and then there was the signing ceremony in Paris with European politicians, with Clinton and Russian PM Chernomyrdin on December 14, 1995 They say the accords brought peace End of war is usually understood as the beginning of something new: punishment of war criminals Establishment of a system to facilitate sustainable development and prevent the danger of war starting again Husnija, as somebody who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in wartime and after Dayton, you can answer my question in two ways: as an inhabitant and as an historian What are the Dayton Accords? Did they bring peace only in the sense of stopping the war or did they build a foundation for a successful development of the country that won’t be in danger of being unsettled by the smallest thing? Considering the situation in Bosnia today, I fear I know the answer Economically Bosnia is at a standstill, political development was only temporarily interrupted by the war and is unchanged Let’s put aside last municipal elections, they brought some unusual changes, which are worrying the old forces Let’s add a statement from today’s papers, when Bosnia was visited by one of the guarantees of Dayton, Russian foreign minister Lavrov, who said Dayton Accords should not be changed Which is complete opposite to what we are hearing, what Husnija will tell us As somebody who spent the whole war in Sarajevo, the signing of the Accords and the coming of peace meant a lot to us. The end of shooting and killing was very important at that moment As somebody living here, I didn’t think how the country will grow and what it all means. It was vital the killing stopped and in that sense, as people who lived thru the horrors of war, exposed to everyday bombings, living in inhumane conditions without electricity, water, with very little or no food etc the signing of peace accords meant a lot to us It’s another thing looking at it from today’s perspective What it meant and if the Accords, as they were signed, are the reason

Bosnia is at a standstill for so long, why we don’t have any democratic progress, why there’s such poverty, why there’s so much corruption etc Everybody wants to put all blame on Dayton ‘Dayton is to blame for everything,’ they say ‘It’s straight jacket You cannot function in it.’ I’d only partially agree with that I believe the way the state was organised in Dayton, promoting exclusively ethnic divides, gives room to ethnic elites to stay in power, insisting on this ethnic principle and they use this for corruption, to enrich themselves This type of system has enabled these corrupt political ethnic elites to stay in power and always invoke these Dayton decrees, to invoke national rights, we’ve seen this with HDZ, invoking vital national interest and the debate is about taxing betting, as betting agencies are mostly owned by people close to HDZ. So, when the state wants to tax betting agencies they say this is vital Croatian national interest This Dayton system opens a possibility to abuse this principle in such a way It’s almost a caricature of itself and it makes functioning of state harder But there are occasions when the Dayton Accords can’t be blamed: when the state functions badly and is economically weak In Sarajevo they will blame Dodik for water shortages or stray dogs on the streets and a thousand other problems But this is not a problem of the Dayton system, but a problem of political elites who are not capable of solving people’s problems Dayton is a bad solution. By promoting exclusively ethnic representation opens the possibility for almost comic misuse and this inhibits progress But on the other hand, there’s plenty of things that don’t depend on Dayton, where lower levels of government could function, develop industry etc but they don’t do that. This leads us to conclude, Dayton is not to blame for everything, but mainly political elites who are very corrupt and that’s why Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a standstill for so long Another thing that can be seen lately when we speak of Dayton, demands for change. Often there is emphasis on the need to establish a country which will be based on civil values, for development of civil society and not only on the basis of ethno-democracy That’s good but the ones advocating it are not credible because on the one hand they talk of civil society and on the other hand, they work exclusively on strengthening these ethnic politics and that’s a problem today in Bosnia In the local elections we had a case where one candidate threatened the ones advocating civil Bosnia and Herzegovina while his party

in for civil Bosnia and Herzegovina So we have non-credible political forces, partly, who are advocating civil society Let’s conclude with something else You are both part of different activities in society, not only historiographical But within this field we should mention you are both authors of a document called ‘Historians Against Revisionism’ A question for Husnija: How is history manipulated in terms of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war in both entities, in both constituent parts of Bosnia and how is this reflected in in curricula What you just talked about, the education of a citizen as opposed to education of a Bosniak, Croat or Serb is based on a suitable curriculum, this is where it starts And for Božo, how is this handled in other parts of Ex-Yugoslavia? I’ll be short. Views on the break-up of Yugoslavia are divided here, of course It’s a reflection of our divided society. Our curricula is divided, our history books are divided There are three study programmes There are many textbooks, but they all fit the three national programmes: Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak Textbooks are in three languages: Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak, even though we understand each other There is great division regarding start of the war, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the whole Yugoslav period They all point of only the bad side of life in Yugoslavia and regarding the start of the war, all blame is attributed to the other side When you read Serbian textbooks Bosniaks and Croatians are the main culprits for starting the war because they wanted to leave Yugoslavia and this desire to secede and drag Bosnian Serbs with them led to war When you read Bosniak textbooks Serbs are key culprits as they were preparing this for a long time, they wanted to include Bosnia in the Greater Serbia etc In Croatian textbooks we have a similar narrative, key culprits were Serbs but then Bosniaks also provoked a war with Croatians as they wanted to replace the territories they lost to Serbs with those taken from Croatians The circle is closed and we still don’t have a real history what happened here but complete division Not all historians are stuck in these nationalistic frameworks but what is imposed as public discourse is marked by national divisions Serbian textbooks, Croatian textbooks and Bosniak textbooks Serbian version of the breakup, Croatian version, Bosniak version This can’t be good. Me and a younger group of people are trying to do something, not creating a common picture of the past, but simply find a common denominator, try to understand unencumbered by a political or nationalistic agenda and present what really happened before and after

the war and that is, of course, a long process First, a few things more on Dayton Stopping the war is a great achievement of this agreement, Husnija described it very vividly from a personal experience. He once told me how during the war, twice a day he had to cross open space, under the control of Serb snipers, twice a day, to work and from work. If you imagine only this it’s clear you want the end of the war So, this was a great achievement It’s probably also a great achievement Dayton saved Bosnia as a state We have to know this In all these wars in former Yugoslavia, only Bosnia was endangered as state In other places it was about more or less territory, independence etc and it was not a question of territorial integrity That’s another big thing But also, we didn’t mention this yet, cemented ethnic cleansing Dayton Accords, today’s Bosnia grew from what was achieved during the war including ethnic cleansing This is what suffocates it today This is the source of the politics of the three entities which the civil concept cannot defeat We know about political elites Bosnia has an additional problem but even in Slovenia political elites can’t come to an agreement regarding normal voting laws as this doesn’t suit them, it’s the basis of their existence And in Bosnia it’s 100 times worse Regarding historiography in former Yugoslavia, it has to be said All these small countries that came into being are facing a post-Yugoslav syndrome for the past 30 years Whether they succeeded in joining EU like Slovenia and Croatia, or not We have a great deficit in democracy and a lot of nationalism and this influences the relationship to history History is politics in our countries Recent history or even older, back to the Middle Ages, is politics It’s interesting, in the former state, Yugoslavia was to blame for everything, we all felt we were taken advantage of, so today’s historic perception is that Yugoslavia was a criminal communist state from which we barely escaped, despite the fact we built it together and also destroyed it together. This can be seen in the historical narrative in media, politics, educational systems and this is what we’re fighting against Thank you both for this debate Let’s hope the old saying ‘peaceful Bosnia’ will remain and develop, so its inhabitants can live peacefully and successfully I’d like to thank our viewers for following us and I invite them to watch our other debates which are available on YouTube